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Introduction  
The Iranian issue looms large in the EU’s foreign policy priorities not only because of its strategic 
significance, but above all because the way it is being tackled by the EU is indicative of an 
important international phenomenon. By the latter we mean the Union’s ability to act as an agent 
of modernity in world politics. Is it possible to resolve the Iran problem without submission or war? 
This article argues that in Iran the EU is about to work out a new style of assertive multilateral 
commercial power diplomacy that will make use of its leverage as of the world’s dominant trading 
and economic power to avert the worst-case military scenario. This policy per se, however, is not 
sufficient to ensure an effective and peaceful settlement of the Iranian issue unless the 
Europeans manage to cut a diplomatic deal with China and engage the United States in direct 
talks with Tehran. 
Iran’s controversial uranium enrichment program, which the EU believes is being aimed at 
creating nuclear weapons, is perceived in Europe as potentially the most serious threat to 
international security.[1] Although European and international experts disagree when assessing 
the time frame for Iran’s capacity to start producing nuclear weapons (from several months to 10 
years), strategic planners in EU countries cannot afford the luxury of negligence when tackling 
this problem.[2] The time is believed to be lapsing. Worried that Iran might be next after the U.S. 
invasion in Iraq in 2003, and spurred on by U.S. bellicose rhetoric, both the Union and its member 
countries have been during the last four years engaged in exponentially active diplomatic 
activities aimed at resolving the problem with Tehran through negotiations. 
Theoretically, the EU has three options in resolving this problem. The first, and the most simple, 
would be to submit to the fact that Iran develops a military nuclear capacity, while believing that 
leaders of any nuclear state are fully aware of the deadly consequences of nuclear weapons and 
will never resort to using them. Interestingly enough, the submission approach has its supporters 
even among some Israeli experts, who argue that the nuclear deterrence doctrine will work with 
Iran exactly as it did with the former Soviet Union.[3] 
This option has at least three substantial drawbacks. First of all, it doesn’t take into account the 
nature of the Iranian regime that is a fundamentalist theocratic state. The policy of such a state is 
not built along the lines of political expediency; its actions are rather guided by uncompromising 
religious convictions. When taking into account the strained relationship between the Muslim 
world and the Christian civilization—a distinctive and an alarming feature of the 21st century 
politics—and the precarious nature of peace in the Middle East, one should not exclude that the 
regime of Ayatollahs is capable of using nuclear weapons as a first strike tool against those 
whom they perceive as “evil,” while disregarding irreversible catastrophic consequences for Iran 
itself. Accordingly, the MAD (mutual assured destruction) doctrine, which was believed to be the 
cornerstone of peace during the Cold War, might not be relevant anymore. Subsequently, the 
deterrence significance of the U.S. nuclear shield for Europe could become nullified. As a result, 
the Euro-Atlantic alliance might lose its strategic importance, and Tehran would evolve as a 
decision-making center with regard to the European security—something that Europeans would 
hardly find amusing. 
Secondly, the international community and, particularly, the EU’s submission to a nuclear-armed 
Iran, would result in undermining the system of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NMT), and will 
actually denote humanity’s endorsement for nuclear arms to spread all over the world with a 
strong possibility of anti-Western terrorist organizations ultimately getting hold of them. Given the 
high population density in Europe and the rise of a ghetto mentality among the frustrated second 
and third generation Muslims in France, Great Britain, and elsewhere, proliferation will 
dramatically multiply risks to their homeland security. 
Thirdly, the emergence of a nuclear Iran, as François Heisbourg, special adviser to the 
Foundation for Strategic Studies in Paris, rightly observes, would most certainly induce a chain 
reaction in the region.[4] After Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and probably some other 
regional players would be prompted to go nuclear due to the logic of strategic response to a new 
security dilemma. Taking into consideration the volatile nature of the geopolitical situation in the 
region, which has permanently been an arena for conflicts among states, confessions, and 
ethnicity, the possession of nuclear arms by its major countries might sooner or later result in 
wreaking havoc. Europe’s strategic dependence on energy imports from the Middle East is a very 
tangible rationale behind the Union’s commitment to preserving the non-nuclear status of the 
region. 
Therefore, it may be concluded that the EU submitting to Iran's strategic transition to nuclear 
status is by no means a viable option. 
The second option comes down to a pre-emptive military strike on Iran. The United States 
Department of Defense is reported to have prepared a detailed plan of air strikes against key 
military and strategic facilities in Iran including its ground and underground nuclear sites[5]. The 
aim of a military operation would be not only to deprive Iran of its capacity to produce nuclear 
weapons, but also to eliminate its ability to reciprocate militarily[6]. This is why the Pentagon’s 
plan allegedly envisages destruction of the entire Iranian military infrastructure thereby completely 
cutting down their armed forces’ operational network. Theoretically, the EU countries might 
support a U.S. military operation either within the framework of NATO, or individually.[7] However, 
to justify such support of European public opinion, it is necessary to ensure U.S. compliance with 
the norms of the international law. To make a pre-emptive strike against Iran a legitimate action, 
the appropriate governments should provide tangible evidence. In the absence of a compelling 
justification, a military strike on Iran would look like a preposterous reproduction of the Iraq war 
that was propelled by a biased reading of intelligence assessments. 
To grant their unified support for the belligerent position of the Bush Administration on the Iranian 
issue has become a particularly complicated matter for the EU in view of the controversial 
conclusions of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report on Iran Safeguards sent to 
IAEA Board on November 15, 2007. The report concluded that the Iranian authorities were 
cooperative in providing information on their past nuclear activities. Yet, “the Agency has no 
concrete information, other than that addressed through the work plan, about possible current 
undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.” Most importantly, “contrary to the decisions of 
the Security Council, Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities, having continued 
the operation of PFEP and FEP. Iran has also continued the construction of the IR-40 and 
operation of the Heavy Water Production Plant.”[8] The report was read by EU-3 Germany 
France and Great Britain as an indication of Iranian non-compliance. “We are disappointed that 
cooperation is of a partial and reactive nature," the EU-3 statement said.[9] Noteworthy, the 
statement carefully avoided US-style bellicose rhetoric on Iran, or a hint of a military option being 
on the table. 
The bottom line is that military coercion is fraught with dangerous strategic, economic, and 
humanitarian repercussions. First of all, it may bring an unacceptable scope of damage for the 
West including Europe, as a result of asymmetrical retaliation on the part of Iran and its proxies, 
including al-Qaeda. Thus, Europe—already a place for Islamic radical cells — may be subject to 
terrorist actions on the part of Iran-sponsored groups, while a repetition of a deja-vu American 
war in the Middle East is most likely to spur a new tide of hatred and belligerence against the 
United States and its allies in different parts of the world. One should recall the 2004 Madrid train 
bombings, the terrorist attacks in London in July 2005, and the mass violence in Paris' Muslim 
suburbs in November 2005 and 2007, just to comprehend that some European democracies 
would rather defer to a nuclear Iran than face a military clash with Iran that might cause much 
larger upheavals and chaos as a result of its vengeance. 
Secondly, a strike against Iran would lead to disruption of Iranian oil and gas deliveries abroad, 
causing serious economic damage to its major energy importers, including Italy, Germany, Japan, 
India, and China. If Iran retaliates by striking oil facilities in Saudi Arabia, or blocking the Strait of 
Hormuz, an indispensable route for the Persian Gulf oil supplies, it would not only boost the 
already soaring world oil prices to new record heights; but given the magnitude of petroleum to 
the world's economic performance, its protracted shortage might result in an outbreak of a global 
economic, social, and financial crisis.[10]  
Thirdly, bombing Iran risks provoking a serious destabilization of the Middle Eastern region at 
large as a result of a massive refugee exodus and a consequent humanitarian catastrophe like 
the one that took place in Lebanon after Israeli raids against Hezbollah in July 2006, or the 
massive displacement of Iraqis since 2003 as a result of the military overthrow of Saddam 
Hussein’s regime by the United States and Great Britain.  
So, anticipated security benefits that a military strike on Iran might deliver in the long-run appear 
to form a highly volatile equilibrium with overall costs of repercussions that might follow in the 
mid-term, particularly in light of the background of dubious fruits of the analogous operation in 
Iraq. 
Finally, there is a third option. It combines a set of economic and political incentives with pressure. 
The essence of this carrots and sticks approach is to peacefully compel Iran to stop the 
enrichment of uranium. The carrots mode implies proposing a package of commercial bonuses 
and technical assistance coupled with security guarantees for Iran in exchange for its consent to 
halt uranium enrichment. The EU has been pursuing incentives diplomacy on Iran while 
negotiating with Tehran since October 2003 through EU-3 for 2-1/2 years and, since September 
2006, via the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Described by 
Javier Solana as “very serious,” the EU’s carrots package to the Iranians in exchange for their 
compliance encompasses several elements, including trade, technological and financial aid, and 
security safeguards.[11] This policy has been seen as an alternative to the U.S. “cowboy 
diplomacy” that led to war on Iraq, and which could ultimately target Iran. 
In the meantime, the sticks policy implies a variety of financial and economic sanctions in the 
fashion of those that had been introduced against North Korea. Analogous measures vis-à-vis 
Iran have been initiated by the UN Security Council at the multinational level in 2006 and 2007, 
and by the U.S. Administration unilaterally. The measures include visa restrictions and banning 
access to Iranian assets abroad for the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. Although relatively painful, 
these limitations are mostly of symbolic nature, and cannot seriously harm Iran’s economy. They 
are not likely to give the slightest chance to expectations of regime change in Iran. The economic 
pressure on Iran, however, has not been implemented in full, and is worth giving a try. 
The option envisages, for example, the reduction of trade relations to minimum volumes with a 
possibility of import and export embargoes. It may prove extremely vulnerable to the Iranian 
economy given its high dependency on trade (a 31.6 percent export share in the GDP in 
2006).[12] The EU might play a pivotal role in economic coercion as the EU countries in total 
account for about 28 percent of Iran’s foreign trade exceeding China’s and Russia’s share 2- and 
almost 14-fold respectively [See Table 1].  
Table 1: Iran's Top Ten Trading Partners (2006) 
Imports  Exports  Imports + Exports  
Partner  Mio €  %  Partner  Mio €  %  Partner  Mio €  %  
World  36.651  100,0 World  53.531  100,0 World  90.182  100,0 
1 EU  12.259  
   
33,4  1 EU  12.815  23,9  1 EU  25.074  27,8  
2 China  
   
3.910  
   
10,7  
   
2 Japan  
   
7.846  
   
14,7  
   
2 China  
   
11.086  
   
12,3  
   
3 UAE  3.477 9,5  
   
3 China  7.176  13,4  3 Japan  8.871  9,8 
4 Korea  
   
2.308  6,3  
   
4 Turkey  4.057  7,6  
   
4 Korea  5.514  6,1 
5 Russia  
   
1.655  4,5  
   
5 Korea  3.206  6,0  
   
5 Turkey  4.963  5,5 
6 India  
   
1.283  
   
3,5  
   
6 S. Africa  2.151  
   
4,0  
   
6 UAE 3.980  4,4 
7 Brazil  
   
1.044  2,8  
   
7 Singapore  1.260  2,4  
   
7 S. Africa 2.336  2,6 
8 Japan  
   
1.024  2,8  
   
8 Philippines  1.041  1,9  
   
8 India  1.842  2,0 
9 Kazakhstan  
   
977  2,7  
   
9 Syria 609  1,1  
  
   
9 Russia  1.826 2,0 
10 
Turkmenistan  
906  2,5  
   
10 India  560  1,0  10 
Singapore 
1.659  1,8 
Source: IMF (Dots), EU DG Trade Statistics 
Germany, with some 1,700 companies engaged, is the leading European exporter to the Iranian 
market. With a 5 percent share in Iran’s foreign trade, the Bundesrepublik ranks fifth in the list of 
Tehran’s major trade partners in 2006—an apparent fall from the top place it occupied earlier. 
However, in terms of its economic leverage vis-à-vis Iran, and given the asymmetric nature of its 
bilateral commercial relationship, Germany’s clout should not be underestimated. According to 
some assessments, about 70 percent of Iran’s industries are dependent on imports from 
Germany. Commercial and technological ties with Germany are of critical importance for a 
number of Iranian industries that rely on imports of machinery, equipment, and their parts for oil 
and gas production, electric generators, gas turbines, mechanical and electric appliances, and 
power generators[13]. Therefore, curbing European deliveries to those sectors of the Iranian 
economy and industries that cannot function without uninterrupted supplies of goods, spare parts, 
and material from the EU, could be used as a tangible instrument in the Union’s economic power 
diplomacy.  
This option, however, encounters a number of obstacles. First of all, it implies a high degree of 
solidarity among the EU countries. While reaching a consensus among these states is requisite, it 
is also crucial to ensure solidarity on the part of the other major trading partners of Iran including 
China and Russia due to their special relations with Tehran. The bottom line is that China alone 
might undermine the whole idea of commercial coercion. Chinese companies now account for 
10.7 percent in Iran’s imports, and would be able to make up for the EU’s goods on the Iranian 
market in case the Europeans resort to a comprehensive trade-banning regime on Iran. 
Another factor—the EU’s imports of Iranian oil—is equally contentious. On the one hand, it 
provides the Union with the clout to press Iran economically, given the 17.7 percent share of 
European countries in Iran’s total oil exports of 2.5 million bbl/d[14]. On the other hand, in case of 
an EU trade war with Iran, the latter might seize its oil deliveries to Europe. Would this cause a 
significant damage to the European economies? Apparently, an answer is crucial for the Union’s 
further strategy planning. Our analysis shows that while the Italian and particularly the Greek 
economies might indeed suffer, at least temporarily, before they manage to compensate the 
shortage with the help of other oil exporters, the rest of the EU would not be exposed to any 
serious harm, for the key European economies including Germany and Great Britain do not 
import any substantial quantities of oil from Iran, while France’s imports of Iranian oil account only 
for several percent of its total petroleum supplies from abroad [See Table 2]. 
The most vulnerable spot of the Iranian economy is its dependency on gasoline imports. In the 
previous years they accounted for almost half of their domestic consumption. The major suppliers 
of gasoline to Iran are several European-based transnational companies, including Swiss Vitol, 
French Total and the UK’s British Petroleum. In the view of US-pushed sanctions, the Iranians 
have been seeking to end their strategic dependency by constructing new and modernizing old 
refineries (by September 2007, the volumes of imported gasoline decreased almost by 60 percent 
when compared with 2006.)[15] However, the international community could still apply substantial 
pressure on Tehran by banning gasoline deliveries to Iran. There are several options in this 
regard. One is to curtail operations of Naftiran Intertrade Co. (NICO). This company, based near 
Lausanne in Switzerland, is a branch of National Iranian Oil Co. (NIOC), a state-owned agency 
authorized to manage Iran’s imports of gasoline and other light-freighted fuels. Another option is 
to introduce the EU’s sanctions against NIOC’s major trade partner in Europe—Vitol, which, 
according to Energy Compass, accounts for 60 percent of gasoline cargoes being delivered to 
Iran from abroad. Finally, the United States could squeeze gasoline supplies to Iran by setting a 
blockade of its major delivery routes, and in the first run, the port of Bandar Abbas, which is the 
principle gasoline delivery point in Iran. 
These measures coupled with financial, investment, and other commercial restrictions in dealing 
with Tehran could, hypothetically induce social unrest and prompt political destabilization in Iran, 
conceivably leading to a change of the government. There are, however, no guarantees that any 
next administration in Iran would not be comprised of a new bunch of hard-liners inclined to 
pursue even harsher anti-American, anti-Israeli, and anti-Western policies than the incumbent 
regime. 
Table 2: Dependency of Selected Countries on Iranian Oil (Thousand bbl/d, 2006) 
Total Imports  Consumption  Country  
Volume  Iran’s 
share, %  
Imports from Iran  





Japan  5179  8,6  448  5300  8,4  125  
China  3600  9,3  335  7400  4,5  3800  
South Korea  3000  6,8  204  2200  9,2  N/A  
Italy  1549  12,3  191  1700  11,2  151  
France  1570  4,5  135           
Greece  432,6  27,0  117  439  26,6  6,4  
Source: Calculated on the basis of IEA data 
Next, Iran’s top leadership is taking a tough stance on the nuclear issue. While considering the 
pursuit of its nuclear program as its legitimate sovereign right, Tehran might be using its 
negotiations with the EU as a disguise with the purpose of buying the time needed for developing 
this weapons technology. These tactics, if successfully pursued, would allow the regime to 
eventually present the world with nuclear-armed Iran as a fait accompli. Moreover, it is quite 
possible that Iranian negotiators are even ready to make some tactical concessions to their 
counterparts to avoid the imposition of sanctions, which are otherwise able to financially and 
technologically complicate the pursuit of their nuclear program for some time.  
Since the first two options in dealing with Iran—according to European policy-makers—are both 
unacceptable for the EU, the Union has resorted to diplomacy. The EU’s diplomatic measures 
have so far focused on the following two activities: 
1. attempts to urge Russia to put pressure on Iran; and 
2. direct talks between the EU and Iran with an emphasis on carrots diplomacy.  
The results of these diplomatic endeavors so far have proven to be disappointingly unsuccessful. 
Moscow, for example, appears to be implicitly supporting Iran’s non-compliance by taking an 
ambiguous approach. Thus President Putin has expressed a fundamental disagreement with the 
West’s claim that the Iranian nuclear program is militarily-oriented.[16] The Russian leader also 
warned against threatening Iran while calling these tactics “hopeless,”[17] and promised the 
Iranians to continue Russia’s cooperation with them.[18] Russia, together with China, are the 
major arms exporters to Iran [See Table 3]. In conjunction with Chinese arms deliveries to the 
Iranian Navy, Russia’s weapons supplies to for Iranian air defense and to its Air Force are 
skillfully embedded in Tehran’s strategy of deterring a possible U.S. military strike on Iran. The 
advanced Russia-made Tor-M1 surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems delivered to Iran by January 
2007 are believed to be placed near Iranian nuclear sites, including the nuclear reactor in 
Bushehr which is under construction with Moscow’s assistance.[19] In parallel, the Russians have 
attempted to safeguard the prevention of a Western military option regarding Iran by diplomatic 
means: during the Summit of the Caspian Sea Littoral States in October 2007, it was agreed that 
the adjacent states will not provide their territory for military actions against any of them.[20] 
Since Russia has veto power in the UNSC, the Iranians may rest assured that the international 
community is effectively split over the issue of how to proceed with Tehran. By and large, the 
European diplomats may reasonably doubt the Kremlin’s professed commitment to making the 
Iranians change their adamant position on the nuclear issue. 
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The carrots diplomacy has also borne no fruit. The Iranians expressed their interest in expanding 
their cooperation with the EU, but have nonetheless defied compliance. Therefore, the sticks 
approach to Iran started gaining proponents among EU member states. In October/November 
2007, while the EU’s chief foreign policy representative continued to engage Iran through 
negotiations, French officials appealed to their European colleagues to consolidate their policies, 
and resorted to threats to impose sanctions on Iran.[21] French President Nicolas Sarkozy 
outlined his country’s approach in the following way: “France's position, it's that: no nuclear 
weapon for Iran, an arsenal of sanctions to convince them, negotiations, discussions, 
firmness.”[22] In November 2007, Paris was supported by London and Berlin as British Prime 
Minister Gordon Brown and German Chancellor Angela Merkel expressed their resolute intention 
to coerce Iran economically.[23] This approach is implemented through a set of multi-layer 
activities: preparation of a third round of sanctions on Iran at the UNSC;[24] working out joint 
European restrictive measures; and coordination of these measures with the U.S. Administration. 
The idea behind these activities is to cut the financial resources Iran may need to proceed with its 
nuclear program, and thereby coerce Tehran into ceasing its program of uranium enrichment. 
However, in the absence of genuine multilateral support and above all, due to an intransigent 
position of all major parties involved, including the Iranian leadership, the U.S. Administration, 
Moscow and Beijing, it is most likely that EU-U.S. policy of economic suffocating, however painful 
to the economy of Iran, would not bring anticipated results. 
There are three major reasons for that. First of all, the Iranian power holders are committed to 
proceeding with their nuclear program, which they appear to consider as a symbol of their 
nation’s grandeur and as leverage against nuclear-armed Israel and the interventionist United 
States. Therefore, they would rather expose the Iranian people to hardships and sacrifices than 
submit to the demands of the West. Secondly, Iran, an oil producing country, has substantial 
revenues from its energy exports that—given the high and rising oil prices—would enable them to 
keep their economy afloat even after the total interruption of trade and economic ties with the 
West. Thirdly, Chinese companies operating inside and outside Iran would be able to make up for 
any production losses that might be incurred by a European withdrawal from the Iranian market. 
While concentrating their Iranian policies on sanctions, the European governments appear to be 
overlooking two important guidelines in tackling the issue. These two guidelines entail engaging 
two the most powerful world players—China and the United States—in changing their modes of 
dealing with the Iranian regime. A key and the most dynamic economic partner of Iran, China is 
able to apply real power to international sanctions in case it supports them. Beijing has already 
proved helpful in handling the North Korean nuclear issue, and it looks that by all counts the 
Chinese are strongly interested in non-proliferation. In dealing with China, the Europeans would 
certainly be much better equipped if the Reform Treaty were already in power. Although it would 
certainly not ensure China’s compliance, it would still definitely give the Union important leverage 
in its diplomacy with Beijing. So far, the interaction on Iran between the EU and the PRC has 
been limited to a mere exchange of information between Javier Solana and the Chinese Foreign 
Minister.[25] As for diplomatic tactics, much would have depended on the skills, imagination, and 
stamina of a new European foreign policy supremo. This is why a person to fit such a position 
should be of the highest diplomatic and political caliber, able to be up to his/her unprecedented 
historic mission of not only eloquently “speaking” on Europe’s behalf, but also creatively 
designing and decisively and persistently pursuing its external policies. While the Chinese, on 
several occasions, have expressed their opposition to imposing new UN sanctions on Iran, the 
EU could attempt to make them more cooperative on the issue both by persuasion and 
sophisticated bargaining, e.g., through lifting Europe’s arms embargo on the PRC in exchange for 
its tangible pressure on Tehran. 
If the EU could cut a deal with China on Iran, it might probably also prompt Russia to rethink its 
Iranian policy. Facing the risk of being sidelined by Beijing as a key non-Western partner for 
Europe, and losing its clout in international diplomacy in the realm of Middle Eastern geopolitics, 
Moscow would most likely be more inclined to cooperate there in concert with the EU. 
Another important element of the EU’s maturing diplomacy on Iran should be a more pro-active 
approach to Europe’s major ally, and simultaneously, Tehran’s pivotal foe—the United States. 
While so far it has been Washington that has led the U.S.-EU foreign policy duet on major 
international issues, including the Iranian nuclear program, the Reform Treaty gives sufficient 
institutional and other soft power clout to the Union’s leaders and chief diplomats to enable them 
to make it the other way around. Europe’s major task in this respect would be to correct the U.S. 
international stance in a way that would restrain its temptations to act unilaterally and forcefully in 
world affairs. More precisely, it would mean compelling U.S. policy-makers to refrain from 
belligerent rhetoric on Iran that may prompt the regime to augment its military capabilities with 
WMD. But, above all, the EU should attempt to push the U.S. leaders to initiate direct talks with 
Iran without preconditions. As the incumbent U.S. Administration, according to Condoleeza Rice, 
sees no possibility of negotiating with Tehran unless the latter stops its uranium enrichment, and 
while the Iranians show no indication of their willingness to comply, the world continues to rapidly 
move toward a military scenario. 
Under these circumstances, the EU’s diplomatic tactics should be concentrated on prolonging 
negotiations with Iran through the U.S. presidential election year, 2008, and on using all its 
leverage in restraining the United States from using military force against the Iranians. There is a 
good chance that a new Democratic President, as the candidates' ongoing debate on foreign 
policy, including Iran, demonstrates, would most likely pursue a more rational and far-sighted 
policy on the matter than George W. Bush, and will use diplomacy first, as Hillary Clinton has said; 
or, as Barack Obama has announced, would even talk to rogue states’ leaders “without a 
precondition.”[26] So, the EU’s best policy option would be to hold the current U.S. leaders’ hands 
tied under the table for the next twelve months, and then act in the fashion of diplomatic coercion 
with respect to Iran, together with a new U.S. Administration. The weakened position of the U.S. 
economy coupled with the huge trade dependency of China and Russia on the EU provides the 
Europeans with a rare opportunity to engage Washington, Beijing, and Moscow in a multilateral 
commercial-power diplomacy on Iran—an option of last resort hopefully able to ensure Iranian 
compliance to nuclear non-proliferation proliferation by peaceful means.  
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